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Shady Grove on the Bayou: Louisiana’s Procedural 
Limitations on Legacy Oil Suits in a post-Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. 
Landscape 
INTRODUCTION 
The application of state procedure in federal courts ceased to be 
a simple question decades ago. Where a federal court, sitting in 
diversity, must apply the law of the state in which the court sits, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate the manner and means of 
adjudicating and enforcing state-created rights and remedies. State 
legislatures exacerbate this complexity by using procedural rules as 
a means of regulation, without appreciating that these regulatory-
procedural rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may 
collide.  
This Comment examines one such procedural limitation enacted 
by the Louisiana Legislature: the limited admission of newly minted 
article 1563 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1563 
was enacted in response to lawsuits over environmental damage to 
land caused by generations of oil industry operations, more 
commonly known as legacy litigation. Article 1563(A)(1) allows a 
defendant to admit liability for environmental remediation damages, 
but limits the admission to only that one aspect of the plaintiff-
landowner’s claim, and only for the purpose of funding an 
environmental remediation plan. The new article’s survival in 
federal court is important, as the defendant will be responsible for 
attorney’s fees if found liable. Thus, by providing this procedural 
escape hatch, the legislature allows a defendant to effectively end 
further cost recoupment, ultimately discouraging landowners from 
advancing trial on other theories of recovery. 
Part I of this Comment examines the Louisiana law before 
Corbello v. Iowa Production.1 This Comment then discusses the 
Corbello decision, its economic impact, and the Louisiana 
Legislature’s reforms to date. Next, Part II provides a brief overview 
of state procedure displacement by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and discusses recent cases on this issue. Finally, in Part 
III, this Comment discusses Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
article 1563(A)(1) and its direct conflict with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This Comment concludes by asserting that, 
following the analysis of Shady Grove, state tort law reform 
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measures will need to either modify state substantive law or risk 
displacement in the federal forum. 
I. THE LEGACY PROBLEM: PUBLIC HARM, PRIVATE RECOVERY 
A. The law before Corbello v. Iowa Production 
Louisiana’s civilian tradition prefers specific performance over 
monetary damages for the failure to perform an obligation.2 The 
principal right of an aggrieved obligor is specific performance, with 
an accessory right to recover damages.3 The principle remedy in 
Louisiana,4 specific performance, focuses on restoring the obligee to 
its original position, while also avoiding the imposition of an undue 
burden on the obligor.5 This avoidance of undue burden on the 
obligor was interpreted as a limitation of private property 
environmental damage claims to the fair market value of 
uncontaminated land, and ignored the cost of environmental 
remediation ultimately borne by the private landowner.6 This is in 
accord with the general rule for an award of damages for breach of 
an obligation; where damages are awarded, the award should not be 
excessively burdensome on a party “who, in good faith, might not 
have contemplated such an extensive liability at the time of entering 
into the contract.”7 Louisiana’s legislative enactments prefer 
limiting damages to principles of “enrichment, diminution in value, 
and fair market value.”8 Punitive damages are available only if 
statutorily imposed9 or contained in the parties’ contract.10 In 
                                                                                                             
 2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1986 (2013). 
 3. SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS §1.7, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 15 (2d ed. 2012).  
 4. Id. 
 5. Mary Beth Balhoff, Corbello v. Iowa Production and the Implications of 
Restoration Damages in Louisiana: Drilling Holes in Deep Pockets for Thirty-
Three Million Dollars, 65 LA. L. REV. 271, 277 (2004). 
 6. See Id. at 271 (“Therefore, damages would equal the value of the thing, 
not the cost to rebuild or restore the thing.”). 
 7. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 14.8, at 442. 
 8. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 279. 
 9. See Breaux v. Taylor, No. 06–1145, 2007 WL 1580077, at *1 (W.D. La. 
May 29, 2007); Albert v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 940 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 2006); 
Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988); Ricard v. 
State, 390 So. 2d 882, 886 (La. 1980); Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 
607, 610–11 (La. 1978); Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278 
(La. 1978). 
 10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2013) (“Contracts have the effect of law 
for the parties . . . .”).  
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contrast, other jurisdictions reduce damages to the probable loss in 
value, seeking economic efficiency.11 
Louisiana courts had awarded surface restoration damages for 
decades even though these costs were minor compared to 
contemporary environmental remediation damage awards.12 
Essentially, where restoration costs exceed actual value of the land, 
damages follow a simple formula: replacement costs less 
reasonable depreciation.13 However, there was a countervailing 
argument based on economics: immunizing industry actors from 
the true costs of their conduct would result in an industry 
unmindful of safety and environmental controls, if those controls 
pose a more expensive alternative than eventual anticipated 
remediation costs.14 This lack of accountability permitted 
Louisiana’s oil and gas industry to enjoy “decades of financial 
success . . . while disregarding the effects of their operations on the 
fragile landscape.”15 
The opening act in this drama was a suit by the New Orleans 
Archdiocese following a fire at a low-income family housing unit it 
managed.16 There, the Louisiana Supreme Court held property 
damages are not limited to the fair market value of the property, 
where an owner has a personal reason to restore the property such 
that there is reason to believe the plaintiff will make the repairs.17 In 
Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. 
                                                                                                             
 11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b) (1981) (“If a 
breach results in defective or unfinished construction and the loss in value to the 
injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty, he may recover damages 
based on . . . the reasonable cost of completing performance or of remedying the 
defects if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to 
him.”); see also Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113 
(Okla. 1962) (“[T]he ‘relative economic benefit’ is a proper consideration here.”). 
The Louisiana Civil Code allows similar remedies where obligations arise without 
agreement between the parties where there is enrichment without cause. LA. CIV. 
CODE. ANN. art. 2298 (2013) (“The amount of compensation due is measured by 
the extent to which one is enriched or the other has been impoverished whichever 
is less.”).  
 12. See, e.g., Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1953). 
 13. See, e.g., Nippert v. Baton Rouge Railcar Services, Inc., 526 So. 2d 824, 
827 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 14. Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act: Current 
Law and Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 938 (2011). 
 15. Ryan M. Seidemann, Louisiana Wetlands and Water Law: Recent 
Jurisprudence and Post-Katrina and Rita Imperatives, 51 LOY. L. REV. 861, 874–
75 (2005) (stating that the industry should be held accountable for “decades of 
financial success . . . enjoyed while disregarding the effects of their operations on 
the fragile landscape.”). 
 16. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. La. Gas 
Serv. Co., 618 So. 2d 874, 875 (La. 1993). 
 17.  Id. at 880. 
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Louisiana Gas Service Company, the New Orleans Archdiocese 
purchased an apartment complex from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD or Department).18 The purchase 
imposed an obligation on the Archdiocese to maintain the complex 
for two hundred low-income families for at least fifteen years, or the 
property would revert to the Department’s control.19 Following 
extensive renovations, a fire on the property gutted one of the 
buildings.20 The gas supplier admitted liability, but contested 
damages.21 
The trial court found that, as the restoration costs exceeded the 
market value of the property, the Archdiocese’s recovery was 
limited to market value, less depreciation.22 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court reversed and awarded full restoration costs, finding that the 
Archdiocese could not comply with its obligation to the HUD if the 
award was tethered to the property’s fair market value.23 Noting the 
Archdiocese’s obligation could only be fulfilled by providing low-
income housing to two hundred low-income families on the 
property, the Court found that where the property was used for a 
personal purpose to the owner, damages, including restoration costs, 
may exceed the market value of the property.24 Despite the Roman 
Catholic Church holding, later decisions clarified that mere 
assertions of personal attachment with plans of future development 
do not justify an award in excess of market value.25 
Roman Catholic Church did not involve an individual private 
landowner, but a religious organization conducting charitable 
activities. There, the defendant gas company was required to pay 
restoration costs for a reasonably foreseeable loss due to its own 
negligence. Environmental remediation costs were arguably not as 
foreseeable to Louisiana industry and not based on a specific 
tortious act. This next section will discuss Louisiana’s courts 
applying the reasoning of Roman Catholic Church to a case 
brought by a private landowner alleging decades of environmental 
damages and the defendant’s breach of a contractual obligation to 
restore the land’s surface.  
                                                                                                             
 18. Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 875. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 875–76. 
 23. Id. at 880. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Hornsby v. Bayou Jack Logging, 902 So. 2d 361, 367–68 (La. 2005) 
(reversing trial court award of restoration damages under manifest error standard 
where the plaintiff put forth evidence of significant emotional ties to the land, but 
only plans for future development). 
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B. The Corbello Decision 
Attracting fourteen amicus briefs, Corbello v. Iowa Production 
applied the rule of Roman Catholic Church to the oil and gas 
industry, allowing landowners recovery for environmental 
remediation damages to the tune of $33 million.26 Described as 
having sent “shock waves throughout the legal profession and the oil 
and gas community,”27 Corbello is hardly a radical departure from 
prior law given Roman Catholic Church. Roman Catholic Church 
simply left the courthouse door unsecure, and a South Louisiana 
family was willing to finish the job.  
In 1929, the Heyd family granted a lease to Shell Oil Company, 
who operated the lease until 1985, when it sold the lease to 
Rosewood Resources, Inc., though Shell continued to operate 
facilities on the property.28 The surface lease expired in May of 
1991, but Shell remained on the land for twenty-two additional 
months.29 The landowners brought suit in May of 1992, seeking 
damages for trespass to land, unauthorized disposal of salt water, 
and “for the poor condition of the lease premises.”30 In May 2000, 
the jury found Shell liable to restore the property to its original, pre-
lease condition and awarded $33 million in environmental 
remediation damages.31 Louisiana’s Third Circuit Court of Appeal 
affirmed the environmental damages and increased the award of 
attorney fees and other damages.32  
Louisiana’s Supreme Court rejected Shell’s contention that 
restoration damages need be reasonably or rationally related to the 
actual land value of $108,000.33 The court took notice that the 
contract, as the law between the parties, required Shell to restore the 
property to its pre-lease condition, and that if Shell wanted to limit 
its liability to the market value of the property “it could have 
bargained for such.”34  
While the court noted that it is sometimes logical to balance the 
amount owed by a negligent tortfeasor against the cost to restore the 
                                                                                                             
 26. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 691 (La. 2003). 
 27. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 271. 
 28. Corbello, 850 So. 2d 686, 691. 
 29. Id. at 708. 
 30. Id. at 690–91. 
 31. Id. at 691. 
 32. Id. at 692 (affirming the $33 million to restore the land and $16 million 
for illegal disposal of salt water, increasing attorney fees award from $689,510 to 
$4 million, reversing the trial court’s remittitur of $927,000 for failure to vacate 
the leased premises, and reversing and remanding the trial court’s dismissal of 
claim for exemplary damages). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 694. 
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injured plaintiff, the court reasoned that this balancing should not 
extend to a suit for a breach of contract.35 Balancing was not needed 
where the party was a sophisticated oil company seeking to “alter 
the terms of this contract” to limit its liability.36 If it were to tether 
remediation damages to property value, the Court “would give 
license to oil companies to perform its operations in any manner, 
with indifference as to the aftermath of its operations because of the 
assurance that it would not be responsible for the full cost of 
restoration.”37 The Court found that tethering damages to the market 
value of the property would grant a windfall to the oil companies.38 
The Court specifically rejected Shell’s argument that a private 
landowner should not be awarded remediation damages when there 
is no mechanism to ensure that the money is actually used to 
remediate the property.39  
In Corbello, the court’s decision was strengthened by two policy 
concerns. The first concern was contaminated land with a potential 
for public impact. This public injury to the local water supply 
potentially affects entire communities. The second was discouraging 
landowners from bringing private actions, which would leave only 
“understaffed and underfunded state agencies” to “oppose oil 
companies.”40 The court reasoned that, while allowing recovery to 
the private landowner does not guarantee the land will be 
decontaminated, it was unlikely that oil companies would clean up 
land absent the State’s coercion.41  
C. Corbello’s Impact 
In Corbello, private landowners recovered monetary damages 
after their land—surface, subsurface, and groundwater—was 
contaminated by hazardous materials.42 For the first time, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court allowed the landowners to recover those 
environmental damages without tethering them to the market value 
of the property.43 Even though the court reasoned a windfall would 
have gone to either the landowners or the oil company, the court’s 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 695. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 699. 
 40. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008) 
(Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson is also the author of the Corbello 
opinion.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 38. 
 43. Id.  
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selection of the landowners as windfall recipients (who were, after 
all, now in possession of toxic land due to the actions of defendants 
who profited from the activity)44 subjected the court to criticism 
from commentators.45 
The economic impact of Corbello may be connected to the 
comparative stagnation of energy industry activity in South 
Louisiana for the past decade.46 While energy operations in the 
state’s northern parishes have been strong due to the development of 
unconventional shale resources, conventional drilling in Louisiana 
lags behind Louisiana’s own historical trends and other major 
energy producing states.47 This unconventional production in North 
Louisiana is welcome; however, Louisiana risks becoming 
“exceptionally dependent” on this unconventional resource 
development.48 
Prior to 2000, drilling in Louisiana “was comparable and 
competitive with other major oil and gas producing states,” but 
“activity has fallen considerably since that time.”49 Though the 
Corbello obligation to restore the land to its pre-lease condition only 
arose by contract,50 the “strong perception that Louisiana is a 
litigious state that subjects producers (past and current)” to 
“significant legal obstacles” has contributed to Louisiana being seen 
as “an increasingly difficult place for conventional oil and gas 
producers to operate.”51  
One study, authored by David E. Dismukes, PhD., of Louisiana 
State University’s Center for Energy Studies, found “an important 
and statistically significant deterioration in state drilling activity 
since the inception of the legacy lawsuits.”52 This study argued that 
Corbello and its progeny cost the state nearly $10.5 billion in lost 
economic output.53 The Dismukes study further asserts that legacy 
                                                                                                             
 44. Corbello, 850 So.2d at 695. 
 45. See Balhoff, supra note 5, at 293-94. 
 46. David E. Dismukes, LSU Center for Energy Studies, The Impact of 
Legacy Lawsuits on Conventional Oil and Gas Drilling Louisiana 2 (2012), 
http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/files/images/presentations/2012/DISMUKES_LEGACY_
RPT_02-28-12_FINAL.pdf. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 55. 
 49. Id. at 23. 
 50. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 800–
01 (La. 2005) (concluding that the Louisiana Mineral Code, “in the absence of an 
express lease provision[,] . . . does not impose an implied duty to restore the 
surface to its original, pre-lease condition absent proof that the lessee has 
exercised his rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively.”). Id. at 801. 
 51. Dismukes, supra note 45, at 3. 
 52. Id. at 4. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
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lawsuits have had a “severe impact” on Louisiana industry, as 
“Louisiana’s poor legal climate toward the oil and gas industry is 
causing the state to lose out on substantial conventional drilling 
opportunities and thousands of well-paying jobs to other states.”54 
Some have criticized this study as built on a foundation of oil 
industry polling data,55 though the Louisiana Oil and Gas 
Association denies funding or requesting the study.56 Academic 
criticism of the study was submitted to a joint session of the 
Louisiana House and Senate Committees on Natural Resources.57 In 
a memorandum, Professor Whitelaw, an Economist from the 
University of Oregon, described Dr. Dismukes’ study as “fatally 
flawed, both theoretically and empirically.”58 Specifically, Professor 
Whitelaw criticizes Dr. Dismukes use of industry data only through 
2007 and not accounting for the disruptive effect by hurricanes in 
2005 and 2006.59 
At that same hearing, Joseph Frost of Hilcorp Energy testified 
that legacy litigation has changed their business operations.60 Before 
Corbello, Hilcorp would purchase oil fields from prior operators, 
assuming the obligation to restore the surface from the prior 
operator.61 Hilcorp now signs new leases expressly disavowing 
liability for any prior environmental damage.62 Thus, contemporary 
operators are contractually negating future liability from the decades 
of environmental damage, allegedly caused by prior operators. 
                                                                                                             
 54. Statement of Chris John, President, La. Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Assoc., 
on LSU Study on Negative Economic Impact of Legacy Cites Litigation (Feb. 28, 
2012), http://www.lmoga.com/assets/LMOGA_Statement_-_LSU_Study_on_Leg 
acy_Suits.pdf. 
 55. Mike Staff, Op-Ed Response to LOGA, LOUISIANA TRUTH.ORG (Mar. 20, 
2012), http://louisianatruth.org/?p=228.  
 56. Kyle Barnett, Plaintiff Attorney Seeks to Depose LSU Researcher Who 
Authored ‘Legacy Lawsuits’ Study, LEGAL NEWSLINE LEGAL JOURNAL (Mar. 28, 
2012, 12:23 PM) (statement of Don Briggs of the Louisiana Oil and Gas 
Association), http://legalnewsline.com/in-the-spotlight/235638-plaintiff-attorney -
seeks-to-depose-lsu-researcher-who-authored-legacy-lawsuits-study. 
 57. Discussion of the Effects of and Potential Changes to Act 312 of the 2006 
Regular Session, Hearing before the Joint H. & S. Comm. On Natural Resources, 
2012 Reg. Sess. (4/16/12). 
 58. Memorandum from Dr. Ed Whitelaw and Dr. Bryce Ward, EcoNorthwest, 
to Mr. Robert Gardes, Review of the Dismukes Analysis 1 (Apr. 15, 2012) (on file 
with LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources).  
 59. Id. at 1–2. 
 60. Discussion of the Effects of and Potential Changes to Act 312 of the 2006 
Regular Session, Hearing before the Joint H. & S. Comm. On Natural Resources, 
2012 Reg. Sess. (4/16/12) (statement of Joseph Frost, Executive of HilCorp 
Energy). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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These evolving business practices militate against the projected 
impact of legacy litigation on future mineral exploration and 
production in Louisiana.63  
Corbello highlighted two “meaningful disincentives” to 
encourage prudent oil production operations: regulatory sanction 
and suits by the landowner.64 The Louisiana Supreme Court, 
however, labeled the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 
(“LDNR”) as “understaffed and underfunded”;65 thus the only 
practical disincentives are suits by the private landowner. The next 
step in the legacy litigation saga would be a response from the 
legislature. When the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Corbello 
and held deep-pocketed industrial defendants accountable, the 
Louisiana legislature heeded the call to action on behalf of industry. 
D. The 2003 Louisiana Legislative Response and its Impact 
At the time of Corbello, the Louisiana Oilfield Site Restoration 
Law66 did not offer a “comprehensive solution to the problem of 
oilfield waste sites.”67 Landowners could seek environmental 
remediation damages, and as in traditional tort doctrine, “there was 
no statutory mandate which required landowners to actually use the 
damages awarded to implement remediation or restoration.”68 The 
legislative response was the enactment of legislation to address this 
very issue.69 
In 2003, the Louisiana legislature passed the “usable ground 
water-remediation” statute70 to “cure the problems caused by the 
Corbello decision.”71 The legislative intent was for environmental 
remediation damage awards to have a public benefit by requiring the 
                                                                                                             
 63. These business practices also may result in more legacy litigation arriving 
in federal court by way of diversity jurisdiction. By releasing the current producer, 
the landowner may find himself completely diverse from prior lessees. Prior 
operators may be out of state companies or no longer considered citizens of 
Louisiana for diversity of citizenship purposes.  
 64. Gladstone N. Jones III & Andrew Jacoby, Recent Developments in 
Oilfield Pollution Lawsuits, TULANE LAW SCHOOL SUMMIT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW & POLICY 2 (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles 
/Student_Org_Sites/Tulane_Environmental_Law_Conference/Fri%20200pm%20
Sabine%20-%20Glad%20Jones%20Article.pdf. 
 65. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008). 
 66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:80−30:101 (2007). 
 67. M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 38 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511 (codified at LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 
30:2015.1 (2003) (amended in 2006)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299. 
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landowner to clean up the site and prevent future environmental 
damages.72 The act required the landowner to notify the LDNR and 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality when the suit is 
filed.73 Further, where the court finds that the polluter is liable and 
that contamination is threatening usable ground water, the court 
“shall order” the development of a remediation plan.74 
Consideration is also given to any plan submitted by the plaintiff.75 
The court then determines which plan is most feasible and orders the 
responsible party “to fund implementation of the plan” and to 
deposit the funds with the court.76 
An issue arose concerning the prospect of “double damages”: 
would an industry defendant be forced to pay remediation damages 
to a private landowner (damage number one), and then face 
additional liability (damage number two) in a remediation suit or 
regulatory action brought by the LDNR? The legislature addressed 
this issue by giving the “oil companies a credit for amounts paid to 
the landowner in a subsequent enforcement action.”77 However, the 
act applied only where landowners claimed groundwater 
contamination damages,78 encouraging artful pleading by 
landowners.79 The act did not tether remediation damages to 
property value or balance remediation costs against economic 
benefit allowing restoration damages perceived by some as 
unreasonable.80 
E. The Legislative Response: Act 312 of 2006 
In the 2006 Regular Session, the Legislature of Louisiana passed 
Act 312,81 which one commenter described as “reforming the 
procedure in litigation claiming environmental damages arising 
from oilfield operations.”82 Act 312 contained six components 
                                                                                                             
 72. Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511; M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 39. 
 73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B). 
 74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(C)(1) (2003) (amended in 2006). 
 75. Id. 
 76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(C)(3) (2003) (amended 2006). 
 77. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 699 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:89.1 (2003) (amended 2006)). 
 78. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299. 
 79. See, e.g., Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 
F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. La. 2004); Duhé v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct. 
App. 2001); Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299. 
 80. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299–300. 
 81. Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 1472. 
 82. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 347, 347 (2007).  
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implemented to protect the public interest in legacy litigation.83 
Specifically, (1) the state must receive timely notice of the 
litigation;84 (2) proceedings are stayed until after notice is given;85 
(3) the state is permitted to intervene;86 (4) the LDNR determines 
the environmental damage and most feasible remediation plan;87 (5) 
the LDNR is to oversee the implementation of that plan;88 and (6) 
the act allows recovery of attorney and expert fees.89 A commenter 
observed that Act 312 did not address “claims that are nonoilfield 
and do not allege damage to usable ground water.”90 
The court shall adopt the plan adopted by the LDNR unless a 
party proves that another plan is more feasible by a preponderance 
of the evidence.91 Act 312 requires the court to order those legally 
responsible to fund the implementation of the remediation plan92 by 
depositing those funds into the registry of the court,93 subject to dual 
oversight by the court and the LDNR.94 
Though the Act is “generally perceived as adverse to the 
landowner community,” several sections arguably protect the rights 
and benefits of the landowner.95 Act 312 specifically states that it 
does not impede private contractual agreements obligating a party to 
remediate the site beyond state regulatory requirements.96 The 
legislation is to have no effect on environmental damage claims not 
subject to remediation damage,97 and costs and attorney fees are 
recoverable by the victorious landowner.98 Parties are not free to 
compromise their claims without court approval, and even where 
settled, the remediation costs are deposited with the court.99 This 
requirement could be waived if the settlements was a “minimal 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at 350. 
 84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(1) (2013). 
 85. Id. 
 86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(2) (2013). 
 87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C) (2013). 
 88. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D) (2013). 
 89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(E) (2013).  
 90. Pitre, supra note 83, at 351. 
 91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(5) (2013). 
 92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D) (2013); see also Pitre, supra note 83, at 
353. 
 93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D)(1) (2013). 
 94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(F) (2013). 
 95. Pitre, supra note 83, at 353. 
 96. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (2013).  
 97. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (2013).  
 98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(E)(1) (2013). 
 99. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(J)(1) (2013). 
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amount and is not dispositive of the entire litigation,”100 but what 
exactly constituted a minimal amount was not defined.101 
Act 312 succeeded in lengthening and increasing the cost of 
litigation,102 added a layer of understaffed bureaucracy, and 
“generally discouraged such suits from being filed.”103 Act 312 
failed in “its ostensible purpose of getting more of these sites 
cleaned up.”104 In fact, “[s]ince the enactment of Act 312, very few 
cases have made it through the Act 312 process.”105 Though 
Louisiana based industry has adapted to the new operational 
environment,106 the legislature again took up the task of legacy 
litigation reform in 2012. These recent enactments are discussed in 
the next section. 
F. The Compromise: Acts 754 and 779 of 2012 
The 2012 legislative response to the ongoing legacy litigation 
reformed the procedures for processing legacy lawsuits. The bill’s 
intention was to expedite remediation of environmental 
contamination to state regulatory standards and foster earlier 
resolution of litigated claims.107  
House Bill 618, “the oil industry’s solution,”108 enacted as Act 
Number 754 of 2012, added article 1563 to the Louisiana Code of 
Civil Procedure.109 Specifically, article 1563(A)(1) allows a party to 
make a “limited admission of liability” whereby the “party may 
elect to limit this admission of liability for environmental damages” 
and “if necessary remediate all or a portion of the contamination.”110 
Then, the court refers the case to the LDNR, which, after a public 
hearing, structures the most feasible remediation plan and submits it 
                                                                                                             
 100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(J)(1) (2013). 
 101. Pitre, supra note 83, at 354. 
 102. Jones & Jacoby, supra note 65, at 9. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Claire Juneau, Act 312 – Louisiana Legislature Passes New Measures to 
Speed Remediation Process, LOUISIANA LAW BLOG (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www 
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 106. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 107. La. Act No. 779 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View 
Document.aspx?d=812324.  
 108. Mark Ballard, Committee Backs ‘Legacy’ Bill, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 27, 
2012, at 05A, available at http://www.lmoga.com/news/committee-backs-legacy-
bill. 
 109. La. Act No. 754 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View 
Document.aspx?d=812233.  
 110. Id.  
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to the court.111 The second enactment, Senate Bill 555, modifies 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29112 to allow for the new 
procedural code articles added by Act 754.113 
Some have suggested that the legislation allows the remediation 
standard to be varied based on the property’s intended use, which 
allows the LDNR to circumvent state regulatory levels in 
formulating the environmental remediation plan.114 Others have 
accused the LDNR of bias and a conflict of interest, based on the 
LDNR’s goal of helping the oil industry to extract and produce 
revenues.115   
These enactments come as a direct result of prior failed attempts 
at legacy litigation reform. The previous attempts “failed to live up 
to expectations, and it is not clear whether a significant number of 
defendants will invoke the procedure authorized by this new 
legislation.”116 As of the time of this writing, no court has yet to 
apply this newly enacted procedural rule. 
G. The Actual Effect of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 
1563(A)(1) 
Article 1563(A)(1) must be read in pari materia with section 
30:29. Specifically, section 30:29 provides for the recovery of costs 
and fees “[i]n any civil action in which a party is responsible for 
damages or payments for the evaluation or remediation of 
environmental damage.”117 The recoverable fees and expenses are 
“all costs attributable to producing that portion of the evidence that 
directly relates to the establishment of environmental damage.”118 
Here, environmental damage is any actual or potential damage 
                                                                                                             
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. La. Act No. 779 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View 
Document.aspx?d=812324. 
 114. Press Release, La. Farm Bureau, Louisiana Farm Bureau Concerned over 
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 115. Kevin Mooney, Study Alleges Majority of Legacy Lawsuits Fail to Produce 
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-fail-to-produce-hard-evidence-of-contamination (quoting Haywood Martin, 
Chairman of the Louisiana Chapter of the Sierra Club). 
 116. New Legislation to Address Legacy Lawsuits in Louisiana, MCGLINCHEY 
STAFFORD PLLC (June 14, 2012), http://mcglinchey.com/content 
Detail.asp?id=12062. 
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caused by oilfield exploration or production to soil, surface water, 
groundwater, or sediment.119 
Therefore, by admitting liability for environmental remediation, 
the defendant will effectively extinguish further liability for costs 
and attorney’s fees to prove environmental damages. These costs 
would otherwise be imposed after a finding of liability to include 
costs of taking the case to trial. Section 30:29(E)(1) only provides 
for costs specifically for proving environmental remediation. Thus, 
to the extent that the landowner has filed suit seeking further 
recovery, he may not have a basis to recover costs and attorney fees. 
Forced with the loss of his main cause of action, and with the 
prospect of further costs and fees being deducted out of a later 
recovery, many landowners will dismiss the rest of their claims or 
seek settlement on unfavorable terms. 
Ironically, by permitting a defendant oil company to escape from 
the civil court system and seek refuge behind a state agency, those 
defendants facing near certain liability are the most likely to invoke 
this procedure. This gives the more egregious defendant lower costs 
as compared to one whose liability is not as clear. Also, with fewer 
suits proceeding to trial due to the environmental remediation claim 
being removed, these defendants ultimately face less ancillary 
claims, as would a defendant who chooses to contest the claims to 
trial.  
The fate of this limited admission is thus a matter of importance 
to plaintiff-landowners able to reach federal court. 
II. STATE PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURT 
A. The Not-So Ancient History of the Erie Doctrine 
The application of state law in federal courts is governed by the 
Erie doctrine. Erie famously held that “except in matters governed 
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be 
applied in any case is the law of the state.”120 Soon after the Erie 
decision, Erie’s simplifications ceased. Erie doctrine problems often 
go undetected and unnoticed by courts and litigators unless a party is 
willing to delve into the substantive purpose of state procedural 
rules. It requires treading into the distinction of substantive law and 
procedural rules, a distinction that eludes litigants, stumps scholars, 
and lately splinters the normal alliances of the Supreme Court.121 
                                                                                                             
 119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(1) (2013). 
 120. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 121. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
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The complex development of the Erie Doctrine is beyond the scope 
of this paper.122 Instead, this paper focuses on recent Supreme Court 
interpretations where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are at 
odds with state legislative use of procedure to advance substantive 
policy goals.  
In brief, Congress delegated the power to promulgate uniform 
rules of federal procedure to the Supreme Court in the Rules 
Enabling Act.123 In Sibbach v. Wilson, the Court found the Federal 
Rules within the scope of Congress’s delegation.124 Referring to the 
language of the Rules Enabling Act, Sibbach found that, in order to 
promulgate procedure, the promulgated rule must not “abridge, 
enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”125 A rule is 
procedural if it regulates “the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress.”126 The Sibbach majority 
understood that where a state recognizes a right incompatible with a 
Federal Rule, the Federal Rule governs.127 
Decisions contemporary with Sibbach held that, where the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not “speak directly and 
unmistakably to the exact same matter as the state procedure,” the 
collision between state and federal procedure was dodged by narrow 
interpretation of the Federal Rules.128  The Court’s decisions of this 
period represent the “high-water mark of the Court’s deference to 
state procedural rules.”129 Courts were directed to apply federal 
                                                                                                             
 
II−A, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and 
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Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor as to parts II−B and II−D. 
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 123. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 124. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941). 
 125. Id. at 10. 
 126. Id. at 14. 
 127. Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
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(2013). 
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procedural law with a high deference to state policy, so the 
litigation’s outcome would be substantially the same as if the case 
was in state court.130  
In 1965, the Court began to turn away from strong deference to 
state procedure, instead focusing on Congress’s constitutional power 
to set rules of federal procedure and the reach of these rules via the 
Rules Enabling Act.131 The fact that a state procedural rule was 
actually substantive policy by the state legislature was of no 
consequence, so long as the Federal Rule was within congressional 
power.132 This echoed the initial simplicity of Sibbach, with the 
question squarely set on determining if “a rule really regulates 
procedure.”133 However, the Court only shifted the dispute to the 
scope of the Federal Rule, allowing later courts to narrowly interpret 
the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to avoid 
collision with state procedure.134 
One commenter observed that the Court continued to examine 
state policy to determine the substantive purpose underlying the 
state rule to determine if the state rule spoke to the same issue as the 
Federal Rule.135 Spawning further confusion, decisions of statutory 
interpretations created different meanings for some Federal Rules, 
meanings that varied based on the specific context of the 
litigation.136 These decisions led one commentator to argue that the 
Supreme Court adopted the following policy: evaluating state policy 
rationale to determine the interpretation of Federal Rules, while 
avoiding conflict between state and federal procedure.137 The debate 
centered on whether a Federal Rule controlled the issue,138 while 
avoiding narrow construction of the Federal Rules when the rule’s 
plain meaning required otherwise.139 
What emerged from the “murky waters”140 was a two-track Erie 
analysis. On track one, there existed cases involving a federal rule 
                                                                                                             
 130. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).  
 131. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965). 
 132. Id. at 468 n.9. 
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and a conflicting state rule. In those cases, the federal rule governs 
unless it runs afoul of the Enabling Act;141 the Enabling Act, in turn, 
prohibits federal procedural rules from abridging, enlarging, or 
modifying any substantive right.142 One leading scholar observed 
lower courts gave certain Federal Rules “implausibly broad 
interpretations in order to apply federal law while emptying the 
others of content in order to avoid an Enabling Act challenge.”143 
Where there was no federal rule on point, courts would determine if 
the state law was “sufficiently substantive in that its application was 
required by constitutionally based principles of federalism and 
Erie’s policy goals of avoiding, where possible, disparate outcomes 
in state and federal court as well as the discouragement of undue 
federal-state forum shopping.”144 
The disjointed reading of Federal Rules as having variable 
meanings based on the context of the suit was ultimately an 
untenable position. The Court would have to confront this issue and 
decide if the Federal Rules should be read to avoid collision with 
state procedural rules advancing substantive state policy, or if 
federal procedural rules have a uniform meaning for all litigants. 
The case that emerged was Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. 
v. Allstate Insurance Co.145 
B. Shady Grove: A Complicated Simplification 
The latest case to emerge along Erie’s twisted path, Shady Grove 
began with an automobile accident that injured Sonia Galvez,146 
who sought medical treatment with Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates. Shady Grove then billed Allstate Insurance Co.147 New 
York law gave Allstate thirty days to pay or deny the claim.148 
Allstate paid the claim late, and then refused to pay accrued 
statutory interest on the overdue payment.149 Shady Grove filed a 
diversity suit in the Eastern District of New York to recover the 
unpaid interest on behalf of a class of all others owed interest by 
Allstate.150 The district court dismissed the suit for lack of 
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jurisdiction, reasoning that New York Civil Law and Rules Section 
901(b), which precludes a class action suit for a statutory penalty 
absent express statutory authorization,151 applied in a federal court 
diversity suit.152 The Second Circuit affirmed.153 
A five-justice majority reversed, finding the suit could proceed 
as a class action due to Federal Rule 23 controlling the requirements 
for class certification in federal court154 although five justices were 
not able to reach a majority on the rationale for the decision.155 The 
Scalia plurality refused to search for New York’s purpose, noting 
that, in the face of a direct collision between state and federal 
procedure, the aspirations of the state legislature should not 
determine if a state statute survives preemption.156 Justice Scalia 
criticized the dissent’s method of statutory interpretation to avoid a 
collision between state law and Rule 23, except in those cases where 
the court may be interpreting an ambiguous federal rule to “avoid 
substantial variations between state and federal litigation.”157 The 
opinion considered class action litigation as a tool of litigation 
aggregation altering “only how the claims are processed.”158 
Though lacking a majority regarding the scope of rulemaking 
power under the Enabling Act,159 the plurality opined that a Federal 
Rule is valid if the rule actually regulates procedure, defined as “the 
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for 
disregard or infraction of them.”160 To make this determination, the 
analytical focus should be on the Federal Rules themselves, not their 
effect on individual litigants.161 Writing for a plurality of four 
justices, Justice Scalia read Sibbach to overrule Gasperini.162 Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion held that even state procedural rules 
“bound up with substantive rights could be displaced by [the] 
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Federal Rules.”163 The plurality also accused Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence of “wanting effectively to overrule Sibbach rather than 
to apply it.”164 
The Stevens concurrence shared the analytical approach of the 
dissent but arrived at the opposite conclusion.165 With the Rules 
Enabling Act, Stevens noted, Congress restricted the Supreme Court 
from promulgating “procedural rules that interfere with state 
substantive law.”166 Stevens interpreted that restriction as support for 
the proposition that federal procedure may not displace how a state 
chooses to define “its own rights or remedies.”167 Justice Stevens 
therefore advocated interpreting the Federal Rules “with sensitivity” 
to state interests and policies, despite signing on to parts of the 
majority opinion that labeled this very inquiry “standardless.”168  
For Stevens, the distinction between substantive and procedural 
state law hinged not on the law’s form,169 but “on whether the state 
law actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or 
remedies.”170 In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens found the New York 
statute so generic as to apply to class action suits to recover penalties 
brought in New York for other jurisdiction’s laws, where such suits 
are permitted.171 Further, he noted the law’s legislative history 
lacked “particularly strong evidence,” indicating that New York 
“wished to create a ‘limitation’ on New York’s ‘statutory 
damages.’”172 Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that some state 
procedural rules “must apply in diversity cases because they 
function as part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and 
remedies.”173 That a procedural device makes “litigation easier” 
does not alter who may obtain or how much an individual plaintiff 
may obtain via the statutorily created remedy.174 Thus, Stevens 
thought the state law in Shady Grove was not a part of New York’s 
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substantive rights and remedies and was therefore subject to 
displacement by federal procedural rules in a diversity suit.175 
Writing for four in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg relied on the 
Court’s precedent and accused the majority of departing “radically” 
from that precedent.176 Seeking to interpret Rule 23 “with sensitivity 
to state interests,”177 the dissent sidestepped the collision of federal 
and state procedure, finding Rule 23 “prescribes the considerations 
relevant to class certification . . . but it does not command that a 
particular remedy be available.”178 Justice Ginsburg read section 
901(b) as a substantive limitation on damages and Rule 23 to only 
facilitate efficient litigation.179 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, Rule 23 
“governs procedural aspects of class litigation, but allows state law 
to control” the monetary remedy.180 
Described by one commentator as the “most significant Erie 
opinion of the relatively young twenty-first century,”181 Shady 
Grove pitted the functional approach, which gives high deference to 
state law, against the formalist approach, which empowers the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within the federal court system. 
The Scalia plurality took an “aggressive view that federal procedural 
rules eject contrary state procedural codes, even where they embody 
substantive state law or policy, so long as the federal rule is actually 
procedural and on point.”182 Changes to the Supreme Court bench 
since the decision leave uncertainty as to the how the Court would 
rule if the issue was reargued under the current Court. One thing 
remains certain; namely, divisions amongst the Supreme Court 
Justices over Erie questions “leave[] litigants, lawyers, and 
policymakers uncertain as to precisely when their state laws will or 
will not displace a federal civil rule in federal court.”183 This 
uncertainty should be unsettling for state legislatures using 
procedural rules to advance substantive state policy goals.  
Louisiana sits within the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
How the Fifth Circuit interprets and applies Shady Grove will 
determine the fate of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 
1563(A)(1). 
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C. Shady Grove’s Shadow Reaches New Orleans 
Only one reported decision has come down from the U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals addressing conflicting federal and state law 
since Shady Grove was decided, All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants.184 
In All Plaintiffs, antitrust class action settlement checks mailed to 
plaintiff class members were returned or not cashed by the 
recipients.185 The district court decided to use the unclaimed funds 
to impose a cy pres186 award payable to the University of Texas.187 
The State of Texas intervened, asserting that under Texas unclaimed-
property laws,188 the state was entitled to those unclaimed funds 
mailed to Texas citizens.189 Texas asserted that its Unclaimed 
Property Act was substantive state law that did not conflict with 
federal procedure.190 The opposition argued that FRCP 23(e), which 
grants broad authority for approval of class action settlements, 
makes a district court’s decision regarding disbursement of funds 
applicable to the plaintiff class, regardless of Texas’s claim to the 
property.191  
The court observed that the scope of a federal rule must be 
determined first.192 This threshold determination is to ascertain if the 
rule’s scope is overly broad, as to cause a direct collision with state 
law, or is controlling on the issue before the court.193 In analyzing 
the scope of the rule, a court must consider the “plain meaning of 
the Rule’s language.”194 Where a direct collision is found, the 
Federal Rule must be applied “as long as that Rule is a valid 
exercise of Congress’s rulemaking authority.”195 If this “initial 
inquiry is not determinative[,]” only then will the court “wade into 
the ‘murky waters’ of Erie itself.”196 
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The court first distinguished Shady Grove on the basis that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) “contain[ed] no categorical rule 
entitling plaintiffs to cy pres distribution.”197 Rather, it “merely 
empower[ed] a district court to approve a settlement.”198 Too broad of 
a reading of Rule 23(e) would have been be required to conclude that 
the rule “implicitly occupie[d] the field that the [Texas] Act seeks to 
regulate.”199 
The Fifth Circuit then proceeded under the traditional Erie 
analysis, turning to the “twin aims” of Erie.200 The court concluded 
that the portions of the Act that are “arguably procedural are plainly 
‘bound up’ with ‘state-created rights and obligations.’”201 The act 
grants to the state “an enforceable property right in the income from 
unclaimed property.”202 The Fifth Circuit found the district court erred 
in disregarding the Unclaimed Property Act and Texas property law 
because both were substantive law.203 
Note that the Fifth Circuit followed the framework of the Scalia 
plurality opinion. The state substantive goals of the Texas Unclaimed 
Property Law were only important where there was no federal 
procedural rule on point.204 The federal rule was not read so broadly 
as to control the issue;205 therefore, there was no direct collision, and, 
in such a case, the traditional Erie twin-aims analysis is necessary.206 
III. THE FATE OF LOUISIANA’S ACT 754 IN FEDERAL COURT 
Understanding Shady Grove and its application in the Fifth Circuit 
by way of All Plaintiffs is the key to understanding article 
1563(A)(1)’s fate in federal court. Recall that federal courts follow 
federal procedure, but apply state substantive law. As discussed in the 
prior section, the court first determines if a federal rule controls the 
issue. Only if the rule fails that test will any analysis of the state rule 
be conducted.207 
Louisiana Act 754 of 2012 created Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure article 1563(A)(1), which allows a party to make a limited 
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admission of liability for evaluating and remediating the alleged 
contamination.208 It is important to understand that this is an actual 
admission, but the purposes to which the admission may be used are 
limited by article 1563(A)(1). This limited admission allows a 
defendant to make an admission, while effectively conditioning the 
admission as only applicable to a specific remedy. Under Federal 
Rule 36, a party’s admission of liability “establishes, conclusively, a 
legally operative truth.”209 A party may partially deny or qualify an 
admission,210 but once admitted, the matter is “conclusively 
established.”211 Federal procedural rules deem admissions as 
including those things admitted at oral arguments or in the pleadings 
of the parties,212 which to be effective at limiting the disputed issues, 
must give litigants reliability that an admitted matter is not in 
dispute.213 Parties are not free to make conditional or partial 
admissions.214 
A. Federal Rule 36 Collides with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 
article 1563 
The initial step is to determine if the plain meaning of the federal 
law has a sufficiently broad scope that it directly collides with article 
1563(A)(1) and controls the issue before the court.215 The plain 
language of the Rule is read to determine its coverage of the particular 
issue216 without reading the Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.217 
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This plain reading reveals that Rule 36, in direct contrast to article 
1563, provides that any matter admitted is “conclusively 
established.”218 To be effective, admissions must give litigants the 
ability to rely on what is admitted.219 Article 1563(A)(1) seeks to limit 
the admission of liability for environmental damage so as “not [to] be 
construed as an admission of liability” for environmental damage that 
is not specifically covered by Title 30, Section 29 of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes.220 Article 1563(A)(1) speaks to the same issue as 
Rule 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—the effect of an 
admission as between the parties to the litigation.  
Under article 1563(A)(1), an opposing party may admit to a 
contested legal issue, but the article seeks to restrict that admissions 
effect and use. Conclusively establishing a contested issue of fact is 
an express feature of Rule 36. This conclusive establishment is the 
very core of the admissions’ legal effect. This effect permits litigants 
to rely on what is admitted and remove otherwise contested issues 
from dispute. Conditioning the admission, so that the admitted fact 
must still be proven by an opposing party to the litigation, necessarily 
means that the admitted fact has not been conclusively established. 
Thus, by operation of an article 1563(A)(1) admission, no legal issues 
are, in actuality, removed from dispute, as nothing is actually 
conclusively established. This lack of conclusive establishment limits 
the effectiveness of an admission in federal court and creates a direct 
collision with the plain language of Rule 36 and its purpose.  
This analysis is in line with post-Shady Grove appellate cases, 
finding a direct collision between federal and state procedure. Jones v. 
United Parcel Services, Inc. found federal common law, which 
permitted submitting punitive damages to the jury, in direct conflict 
with the state law requiring the court determine the issue in a separate 
proceeding.221 There, the collision occurred not in the plain text of 
Rule 38,222 but concerned a prior Supreme Court decision that 
squarely held the following: “under federal common law, juries 
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determined issues relating to punitive damages.”223 That a rule 
collision may be based on jurisprudential decisions interpreting a 
Federal Rule supports the conclusion that a collision exists between 
article 1563(A)(1) and jurisprudential rules discussed above. As prior 
court cases interpreting Rule 36 have broadly read this rule, a court 
should look to those cases to determine if Rule 36 occupies the field 
in such a manner to displace article 1563(A)(1). 
One Louisiana district court has written a post-Shady Grove 
opinion finding that, while federal and state procedural rules may 
have a “commonality of purpose,” there must be evidence of a clear 
intention of federal exclusivity for a collision to occur.224 Secondly, 
where a state rule imposes an additional burden on the litigants, so 
long as the “burdens and standards imposed . . . directly correspond 
with the burdens and standards [of a Federal Rule],” no collision 
occurs.225 
At a basic level, both article 1563’s and the Federal Rules’ 
mandates concerning admissions serve a common purpose: allowing 
parties to reduce litigation costs by eliminating undisputed facts from 
contention. However, article 1563’s effects are different from the 
effects of an admission in federal court.226 Under the federal rules on 
the matter, a party’s admission removes the burden from the other 
party of proving that which is admitted, whereas if a defendant makes 
an admission under article 1563, this burden remains. The admission 
does not conclusively establish that which is admitted, as article 1563 
makes the admission conditional. Louisiana’s Code of Civil 
Procedure thus imposes a burden not imposed under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure; namely, a party must prove that which was 
previously admitted by an opposing party. Where the state procedural 
rule imposes burden on the litigants, that burden must “directly 
correspond” with the federal burden.227 Here, the burdens imposed by 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1563 do not correspond in 
this manner, and state procedure collides with the federal.  
A prior district court opinion found no collision between Federal 
Rule 56 and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971, which 
stayed discovery until the plaintiff showed a probability of success on 
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his claims.228 The court found no direct collision, as “Rule 56 
summary judgment remains available to the parties and [the Louisiana 
special motion to strike] permits the court to order specified discovery 
where necessary,” similar to that allowed by Federal Rule 56.229 In 
contrast, article 1563(A)(1)230 does not give the judiciary discretion to 
find that the limited admission is conclusively established. 
Article 1563(A)(1) seeks to limit the admission—or attach strings 
to it—in ways not allowed by the Federal Rules. The two may not 
coexist; this collision supports a finding of direct conflict.231 Also, 
recall that the majority opinion in Shady Grove found the lack of 
limitations on Rule 23 relevant and “resisted what it saw as New 
York’s attempt to add an additional limitation to the Rule.”232 The fact 
that article 1563(A)(1) seeks to attach a limitation on an admission 
cuts against the plain language of Rule 36 and its purpose. The 
Louisiana limited admission is not “a supplemental and substantive 
rule to provide added protections” to the defendant;233 rather, it is an 
attempt to directly speak to the purpose and effect of a party’s 
admission, a field already occupied by federal procedural law in 
federal court.  
The federal court cannot apply the state limited admission 
procedure while at the same time giving admissions a conclusive 
effect, as the conclusiveness of an admission is not a discretionary 
decision.234 Though the admission may not support that party’s 
alternate theories of recovery or affirmative defenses, a court must 
consider any admission as conclusively established.235 Further, even if 
the admission may prevent the defendant from admitting evidence 
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that contradicts the admission of liability for environmental damages, 
the court must still consider the admission conclusively established.236  
In direct contrast, article 1563(A)(1) permits a party to make a 
limited admission while not waiving any defenses.237 Given this 
contrast, the two procedural rules directly collide and cannot coexist 
within the same civil action. Secondly, where the federal rule makes 
no limitation, a collision arises where the state rule is read to place a 
limitation on the federal rule. Where two rules collide, the next 
determination is if the rule is valid under the Enabling Act.238 
B. Is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 Valid Under the Rules 
Enabling Act?  
Where a direct collision is found, the Federal Rule is applied “as 
long as that Rule is a valid exercise of Congress’s rulemaking 
authority.”239 The rule must “really regulate procedure, —the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law 
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.”240 It is worth noting that the Supreme Court gives 
a presumption of validity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
no rule has yet to be invalidated.241  
Giving an admission a conclusive effect and disallowing the 
limited admission may have “some practical effect on the parties’ 
rights,” but such a position “undeniably regulate[s] only the process 
for enforcing those rights.”242 To Justice Stevens, the question is what 
the rule itself regulates; in the case of Rule 36, the rule regulates the 
conclusive effect of an admission and leaves the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to relief unaltered.243 The limited admission neither 
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provides an additional defense to the defendant, nor shifts the burden 
of proof—both of which would constitute a potential “substantive 
aspect[].”244 
We might consider how scholars approach the issue. Professor 
Carrington proposes that a rule is functionally procedural if the rule 
pertains to federal court operation and is part of a system generally 
applicable to all civil actions.245 A procedural rule is one “designed to 
achieve ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ determinations.”246 The 
conclusive effect of an admission is precisely what Professor 
Carrington’s test defines as procedural. This effect is integrated into 
the federal system, and generally applicable to all civil actions. The 
conclusive effect removes undisputed issues and provides reliability 
to the parties, expediting the civil dispute and reducing costs for 
everyone involved.  
In addition to Professor Carrington’s proposal, we might consider 
Professor Doernberg’s approach. Doernberg advocates an “elements 
approach,” where a court first asks “whether the state law and Federal 
Rule at issue tend to establish or negate an element of the claimant’s 
cause of action or a defense on the merits.”247 If the state law does 
not, then the court must ask if the federal rule does.248 If the federal 
law does, “it trenches upon [the Enabling Act’s] forbidden territory; 
otherwise it is ‘procedural’ for [the Enabling Act’s] purposes and can 
apply.”249 Applying Professor Doernberg’s approach, article 
1563(A)(1) does not prove or negate an element of the cause of 
action; it only seeks to restrict the purpose to which an admission of 
the defendant can be used by the plaintiff in establishing an element 
of his cause of action. On the federal side, the conclusive nature and 
unrestricted use of an admission by the opposing party does not 
establish or negate an element of a cause of action, nor does it 
establish or negate defense on the merits. Using Professor 
Doernberg’s elements approach, it is clear that Federal Rule 36 “is 
‘procedural’ for [Enabling Act] purposes and can apply.”250 
Justice Stevens advocated that one cannot determine if a federal 
rule “impermissibly affects a substantive right without looking to the 
source of the supposed right and considering whether the right-
creating sovereign sought to address substantive goals.”251 The 
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purpose of the rule must be known, and “only the sovereign 
establishing the rule can define that.”252 In the case of Louisiana’s 
legacy litigation reform, the sovereign has established the rule’s 
purpose: it is known from a decision in the highest court of the 
sovereign.253 The purpose is also directly established by the sovereign 
itself in legislation.254 While Justice Stevens no longer sits on the 
Supreme Court, some courts have read his concurrence as 
controlling.255 However, All Plaintiffs was decided by a Fifth Circuit 
panel that followed the framework of the Shady Grove plurality. 
District courts within the Fifth Circuit may be forced to follow this 
framework until overruled by an en banc decision or faced with 
binding Supreme Court precedent.256 
The conclusive effect of an admission is grounded in federal 
procedural law. The rule allows for cost effective litigation; parties 
may focus on litigating the disputed issues. The pertinent Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure regulate only the procedure for enforcing 
rights, and confer no substantive rights. Here, the conclusiveness of 
an admission is within the scope of the Enabling Act, and thus Federal 
Rule 36 is valid in all federal courts regardless of whether it conflicts 
with state law to the contrary. Federal courts should not follow article 
1563(A)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
In her recent article, Professor Margaret S. Thomas advocates a 
restrained reading of the Federal Rules.257 Where a state procedural 
rule actually regulates areas traditionally within the states’ police 
powers, Professor Thomas cautions that “any targeted calibration of 
tort liability using procedural mechanisms, may be swept aside by a 
Federal Rule to the contrary.”258 As one commentator perfectly 
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surmised, “Shady Grove provides a stark example of what can 
happen when [state legislatures try] to reach a substantive 
outcome—decreased liability for defendant businesses—by 
tinkering with procedural mechanisms . . . .”259 Ultimately, when a 
state rule collides with a federal rule, Shady Grove renders 
procedural based tort reform ineffectual in federal court.  
This procedural tinkering by the Louisiana Legislature to 
address legacy litigation reform will fare the same as the substantive 
policy choice of New York in Shady Grove. It will fail in federal 
court. In this post-Shady Grove landscape, the Federal Rules’ 
supremacy over conflicting state procedure is unaffected by the state 
substantive policy goals underlying the rule. Louisiana, and all other 
states, should take great care in modifying state procedural rules to 
advance state substantive policy. 
Given the steps taken by Louisiana oil and gas producers in 
response to Corbello,260 perhaps the “legacy” of Corbello is up for 
debate. Louisiana policy makers must decide whether Corbello’s 
story will be one of industry accountability and the sanctity of 
freedom of contract between producers and landowners, or the tale 
of an opportunistic and extortionist plaintiff’s bar. While the impact 
and ultimate story of Corbello continues to take shape, it is clear 
that—for the near future—state-level tort reform measures should 
modify state substantive law and avoid procedural modifications. A 
change to substantive law may be more difficult: it would involve 
more political capital and might result in a more heavy-handed 
solution. However, tort reform based on substantive law would 
survive a trip to federal court. 
Brian Lindsey∗ 
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